During the mid-and late 1950s, doctors in Japan were consulted by increasing numbers of patients with an unusual combination of alimentary and neurological complaints. The common clinical picture was of abdominal pain and/or diarrhoea, followed within a few days or weeks by painful dysaesthesiae; in addition to the predominantly sensory disturbances, upper and/or lower motor neurone signs occurred in just over 50% of cases, and visual disorders due to optic neuritis in about 28% . The disease was called subacute myelo-optic neuropathy, or SMON. Table I summarizes Kono's (1971) list of SMON's 'cardinal' and other symptoms; of particular importance is that the abdominal symptoms nearly always preceded the neurological. Case-fatality from SMON itself is hard to assess because the disease was very often associated with other conditions, many having a poor prognosis; but it is likely that not more than 5% of SMON patients actually died of the disease itself. On the other hand, probably 90 % ofpatients were left with dysaesthesiae, and 50% with limb weakness, visual impairment, or both; 10 to 15% were completely disabled (Kono, 1971) . By the time the epidemic was over, some 10 000 Japanese were said to have developed SMON, a figure of the same order as the world wide total of thalidomide-deformed children. The main epidemiological features of the disease are summarized in Table II ; these have not been seriously contested by the protagonists or antagonists of the hypothesis on aetiology with which this review is concerned. Kono (1971) Female incidence about twice that of male incidence (2-6 and I 2/annum per 100 000 population of all ages)
Incidence maximum in summer months Incidence maximum in seventh and eighth decades Majority of patients from professional rather than labouring classes Frequently associated with other diseases (see also Table IV) See Kono (1971 and Subacute combined degeneration (SCD) of the cord is the main neurological differential diagnosis of SMON; multiple sclerosis has also to be considered. In addition to pernicious anaemia, SCD may, of course, be associated with a number of intestinal disorders resulting in impaired vitamin B12 adsorption-such as blind loops, strictures, and anastomoses. Coeliac disease, lead, mercury, arsenic, and thallium intoxications also give rise to both abdominal and neurological manifestations, so that SMON was by no means unique in these respects. Neurologists are in general agreement that SMON exhibiting all its neurological features, visual, motor, and sensory, was a distinct and real clinical syndrome, but it is clear that in its less complete forms it was not easily distinguishable from other causes of peripheral neuropathy and myelopathy. Since these incomplete forms (for example, abdominal symptoms and dysaesthesiae) accounted for most cases, opportunities for misdiagnosis were frequent, a fact with obvious implications for epidemiological studies.
For virtually the whole course of the epidemic, which ran from 1955 to 1970, SMON was regarded as probably being an infectious disease (Ogata and Jitsunari, 1970) . The main points in favour of an infective aetiology were a regular summer peak in incidence, and claims that the disease clustered in individuals drinking faecally contaminated water from the same source. Various workers (see Kono, 1971) claimed to have identified or isolated microbiological pathogens. The newness of the disease, its predilection for the elderly rather than the young, and the absence of expected clinical and pathological features of infective disease (for example, in the cerebrospinal fluid) were reasons against the infective theory.
In 1963, a greenish colouration of the tongue was noticed in some SMON patients (Tsubaki, Honma, and Hoshi, 1971a) . Although this observation was thought to be of some possible relevance to the aetiology of SMON, it did not receive much further attention at that time. In February 1970, however, Takasu, Igata, and Toyokura (1970) reported on greenish faeces, and in May 1970 Igata, Hasegawa, and Tsuji (1970) on greenish urine in SMON patients; the green colour was found to be due to the iron chelate of clioquinol (CQL), a gastrointestinal disinfectant agent which had until then been generally thought not to be adsorbed from the gut. The presence of a chelate of CQL in urine demonstrated, however, that the preparation could be adsorbed, and this being so, it was at least possible that CQL was neurotoxic. (David et al. (1933) had recorded the urinary excretion of Vioform many years previously.)
After further investigations, including the demonstration that many SMON patients had recently taken CQL, a public announcement to the effect that CQL was probably the cause of SMON was made early in August 1970, and on 8 September 1970 the Japanese government suspended all further sales of the preparation (except for its very occasional use in exceptional circumstances such as the rare childhood disorder acrodermatitis enteropathica in which CQL is said often to be life-saving).
CQL is the generic name for a group of iodinated hydroxyquinolines; in the West, it is chiefly used (under the brand names Entero-Vioform and Mexaform) for the prophylaxis and treatment of 'traveller's diarrhoea', although the evidence that it is effective for these purposes is equivocal, at best. In other parts of the world, however, the main use of CQL is in the treatment of amoebiasis. Having been available for many years, CQL has never been subjected-to formal clinical trials, but the view of many physicians in countries where amoebiasis is endemic is that the preparation is effective in the treatment of the disease; furthermore, it is cheaper than other amoebicides such as metronidazole. Neurotoxic reactions (possibly dose-related) to huge doses of CQL have been described (Gholz and Arons, 1964) , but these are not the same as SMON.
To date, it has not been suggested, nor is there any evidence, that some CQL preparations cause SMON while others do not, or that substances other than CQL (such as different emulsifiers, contaminants, or degradation products of CQL) were responsible. Clioquinol (CQL) is therefore used here in its generic sense, without implying other substances with which CQL may be mixed or contaminated, or to which it may be degraded (see later). Until the suspension of sales in 1970 nearly 200 CQL-containing preparations were available in Japan although most contained only small amounts of CQL. Over-the-counter sales of CQL probably accounted for one-third or even one-half of total sales.
REASON AND EMOTION IN THE SMON CONTROVERSY
Two misconceptions which have so far substantially clouded the issue when considering the epidemiological evidence for and against CQL as the cause of SMON need to be considered.
First, the fact that CQL sales were suspended in September 1970 is not proof that the preparation caused SMON. CQL sales were suspended for very good reasons of public health. A prima facie case that SMON might be caused by CQL had been made, and clearly needed to be answered. Since the therapeutic value of CQL was not such that there was any obvious likelihood of the sales suspension doing more harm than good, the decision to prohibit further sales was clearly prudent and correct. The scientific question of the nature ofthe association between CQL and SMON is, however, quite separate from the issue of the suspension of sales and has to be judged on different grounds from the practical reasons for the latter. Secondly, the therapeutic value or otherwise of CQL, although certainly relevant to the decision to suspend sales, is irrelevant to the question of whether the preparation caused SMON. It is clearly illogical to base an assessment of the harmful effects of a preparation on a belief that its beneficial effects may be limited. Yet it has often been assumed, both in Japan and elsewhere, that the sales suspension of a 'useless' preparation is evidence that CQL caused SMON.
Reactions to the CQL theory for SMON have to be interpreted against the background of the Japanese experience of environmental pollution; from the radiation of the atomic bombs onwards, pollution in Japan has run at levels of an almost different order of magnitude compared with the rest of the world. Mercury poisoning caused the notorius Minamata disease, and cadmium was responsible for Itai-Itai (ouch!-ouch!) bone disease. Asthma and bronchitis attributable to petrochemical pollution of the atmoshere, and Kanemi rice oil disease consequent on contamination of edible oil with polychlorobiphenyl derivatives are other examples, although they by no means exhaust the list (Ui, 1972) . In addition, Japan was not only one of the earliest countries to license thalidomide but also virtually the last to withdraw it. That the Japanese approach to SMON was to assume that it was caused by CQL unless proved otherwise was therefore largely understandable, especially as there are said to have been 10 000 victims, in contrast for example, to perhaps 800 Minamata disease patients.
However, CQL had been used on a large scale for some 20 years before the SMON epidemic started; this, and analogy with approaches to the investigation of alleged adverse effects of other medicines, suggest that it is more appropriate to seek proof that CQL caused SMON, than that it did not. Clearly, this point is arguable, and neither the positive nor the negative can be established with absolute certainty; but to assume guilt in the absence of proven innocence carries potentially dangerous implications which are discussed later.
In the following review of the epidemiological evidence for and against the CQL hypothesis of SMON, the data discussed are chiefly those of the Japanese investigators who believe a cause and effect relationship between CQL and SMON to have been established. HISTORICAL AND TIME-SEQUENCE DATA Fig. 1 , from Kono (1973) , shows the sales of CQL in Japan from the mid-1930s and the numbers of SMON cases occurring each year. The unbroken line in Fig. 2 , from Kono (1971) , shows the monthly > 10 000. Only one of these possibilities has received any real attention; a series of papers (Katahira, 1972; Katahira and Nakae, 1973; Katahira and Sonoda, 1972; Takasu et al., 1973) has recently claimed that SMON did occur in the pre-war period. The most detailed of these (Takasu et al., 1973) reported findings in 703 typhoid patients admitted to hospital in 1937-38, of whom 30 were given CQL. Of these 703 patients, 16 were found to have dysaesthesiae of the lower limbs; 'SMON was suspected in one case, and it was possible to make a diagnosis of SMON (or it was impossible to deny a diagnosis of SMON) in the remaining 15. In six of these cases, it was difficult not to admit a diagnosis of SMON but there is some possibility that these six did not have the disease'. It was found that CQLtakers were admitted for nearly three times as long as non-takers; accordingly, only the 56 CQL nontakers admitted for more than 70 days were studied further. Four of the 30 CQL takers and four of the 56 CQL non-takers had dysaesthesiae (that is, were possibly SMON cases); the other eight (of the 16 possible SMON cases) fell into the group of CQL non-takers admitted for less than 70 days.
It is uncertain whether any of the 16 possible SMON cases really had SMON and certainly very doubtful for at least six. Of the 16 'cases', 12 had apparently not taken CQL. After several stages of selection, it is difficult to be convinced that like was compared with like. Finally, neurological complications may occur in typhoid itself. This investigation, therefore, failed to demonstrate convincingly that SMON was a real clinical entity in Japan before the second world war (or that it was caused by CQL); the same is true of the other studies. Indeed, Katahira and Nakae (1973) (Tsubaki et al., 1971a) , so some change in CQL-taking habits in August/September 1969 seems to be indicated if the CQL theory of SMON is correct. (More detailed statistical analyses than those on which the projections in Fig. 2 are based could be performed, but are probably unwarranted given the non-specific nature of the incomplete, although commonly occurring, SMON syndrome, and the lack of uniform diagnostic criteria for epidemiological purposes (referred to in more detail in a later section). Moreover, the three projections in Fig. 2 Fig. 2 ), would have been expected had there been a total sales supension in June 1970, that was immediately and completely complied with, on all CQL sales, over-the-counter as well as medically prescribed. Even if all doctors had stopped using CQL completely by June 1970, over-the-counter sales were still presumably made until September 1970 and would have been expected to result in the development of new cases until January 1971, almost certainly in larger numbers than actually accurred; these numbers would have been determined by the pre-June proportion of over-the-counter to total CQL sales, said to be between 30 and 50 %. Experiences at the time (late 1960s) that certain types of pressurized aerosols were implicated as a cause of sudden death in asthmatics (see Fig. 2 of Doll (1973) Although 9249 patients were eventually identified in the studies reported on in 1972, only 2456 were included in the main analyses of CQL-taking, which are summarized in Table V . How the 2456 patients were selected is not clear, and the authors of this part of the report had serious reservations as to how representative the group was. Some prefectures did not return any questionnaires although they often had hundreds of SMON cases. If any conclusions can be drawn from this study, it is clear that even in those patients where CQL ingestion status was known, 25 % had probably not ('Never' and 'Apparently not') taken CQL. If the groups for whom there was no CQL information are also considered these figures could be even higher. It has already been pointed out that the CQL-taking studies appear to have included only those whose CQL intake was definitely recorded; it thus becomes difficult to attribute the SMON patients with no apparent history of CQLtaking to inaccurate recording or recall of CQL intake at a later date.
Estimates of the proportions of SMON patients who did not take CQL vary considerably. They range from only 4% in the 171 hospital patients studied by Tsubaki, Honma, and Hoshi (1971b) through the figures just discussed, to about 50% in the series collected by the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare (1973) . In the latter, 'not taking chinoform' (CQL) was defined as no history of the preparation having been taken for six months before the onset of SMON (although it might have been taken more than six months before or at any time after the onset), a definition which seems reasonable in view of the data of Tsubaki et al. (1971a) on the distribution of intervals between starting CQL and the onset of SMON. The particular value of the six cases in the Ministry series with clinical onsets between February and July 1970 (after the 'green tongue/urine' reports) and especially of the 17 cases with onsets between October 1970 and September 1972 (after both the 'green tongue/ urine' reports and the sales suspension) is that they must have been investigated especially thoroughly with every expectation of positive CQL-taking histories, and yet, no such histories were elicited. It is difficult to accept that serious mistakes over both the diagnosis of SMON and the taking of CQL were made in these patients, and there is thus strong evidence for believing that SMON does occur without CQL; the 17 CQL non-taking cases described after October 1970 constitute about 50% of the total of 30 or so new SMON cases apparently reported after this date.
The observations so far described on the CQLtaking histories of SMON patients were uncontrolled; conclusions drawn from them rest on the assumption that the proportions of SMON patients who took CQL are 'exceedingly high compared with the rate of administration of other drugs' (Kono, 1971) . Certainly, it may sometimes be concluded from uncontrolled observations that a preparation caused a disease; thalidomide is the outstanding example. However, CQL-taking in SMON patients is almost certain to have been a frequent occurrence for at least two reasons. First, the fact that a high proportion of SMON patients had had previous gastrointestinal disease makes it more likely that they would have taken CQL (and other preparations) than individuals without SMON. Secondly, CQL is not only the postulated cause of SMON, it may frequently be its unintentional or intentional treatment; in fact, Takasaki (1967) , Kusui (1969) , and Shibata and Osawa (1970) described its use in the actual management of the disease. In the 752 cases of SMON studied by (diarrhoea and pain) occurred in 84%, and in 87 '4% of these, the abdominal symptoms preceded the neurological. Consequently, as Fig. 3 illustrates, any studies that simply measure CQL-taking in SMON patients over a short period of time, without distinguishing CQL taken for an initial bout of diarrhoea or abdominal pain from CQL taken after the onset of the abdominal symptoms of SMON itself, are virtually guaranteed to find a spuriously high proportion of patients with a history of CQLtaking. The most striking features of SMON are the neurological ones, and results in the Japanese studies of SMON patients have so far been almost exclusively presented in terms of CQL-taking before the onset of the neurological component of the disease without allowance being made for the crucial importance of the intervening onset of its abdominal symptoms. Very few attempts have been made to deal with this difficulty, but in one group of 255 patients 42% had taken CQL before the onset of the prodromal abdominal symptoms (9 % during the course of chronic abdominal disorders); 47% took it after the onset of the abdominal symptoms of SMON and 11 % had not taken it at all (Sobue and Ando, 1970) . In these terms, at least 58% of the patients had not taken CQL before the onset of SMON.
Several studies have described the subsequent SMON incidence in groups of CQL-takers and non-takers; four appear to show a higher incidence in those who took CQL than in those who did not, and their results are summarized in Table VI . If the apparent differences between CQL-takers and non-takers could be interpreted at face value, they would provide compelling evidence for the CQL theory of SMON. There are, however, several reasons why they cannot be so interpreted, at any rate without further information. Table VI tended to conform to the first sterotype described; the characteristics of the CQL non-takers in these studies are, however, largely unknown. Yoshitake and Igata (1970) accept that some factor other than CQL may have been responsible for their findings (Table VI) . At least one paper (Hino, 1972) claimed no excess of SMON in CQL-takers compared with non-takers although, again, methods were not specified. The Medicines (1973) , which suggested that courses of treatment should not exceed 7 * 5 g in total, separated by intervals of at least four weeks. Data of Tsubaki et a!. (1971a) show, however, that while 20-29 g total was the modal dose in this series of 171 patients, 15 patients had taken less than 10 g. In one of the SMON Research Committee reports (1971) 62 out of 508 CQL-takers who developed SMON (there were also 102 cases who had not taken CQL) had taken less than 10 g (mean 52 g). The report explicitly concluded that there was no dose-response relationship.
To establish a graded dose-response relationship for the incidence of SMON, data on CQL dosages for a comparison population are needed (as well as for SMON patients). Three ofthe studies summarized in Table VI (Aoki et al., 1971 ; Kuratsune et al., 1971; Tsubaki et al., 1971b) are apparently the only sources of such information, and none supports a dose-response relationship. Data on CQL doses in SMON patients do not support a dose-response relationship for severity of SMON.
Aggregated regional and countrywide data on CQL sales and SMON incidence provide little or no useful information on dose-response relationship.
INTERNATIONAL DATA It is not certain how many cases of SMON (if any) have occurred outside Japan. The world literature and case reports have been reviewed by independent experts (Rose, 1974) . In brief, there may be some 20 patients whose diagnoses are compatible with SMON, although this is not to say they definitely had SMON. Even if there were 100 such cases, however, the numbers would be trivial compared with those in Japan, both absolutely and relatively, bearing in mind the numbers of people in the rest of the world who have taken CQL. It has been suggested that national CQL sales figures in Japan are misleading, when compared with similar figures for other countries, because dosage differed in Japan by being at high levels and for long periods-that is, a great deal was given to relatively small numbers of patients. There are no objective data by which to judge this possibility, but dosage patterns in Brazil, for example, are said to be very similar to those in Japan. (Smart, 1968; Goldwater, 1971) , and total BHC levels in human fat in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Japan were more than 20 times the figures in the USA and UK (Doguchi, 1973) . Furthermore, most if not all these substances were introduced after the war and their usage in Japan declined sharply in the late 1960s as concern over their potential hazards began to mount. The SMON epidemic conforms to time sequences of this sort considerably more logically than to that of the availability of CQL. The time lag between the marked decline in the use of organomercuric fungicides in 1965 and of chlorinated hydrocarbons in 1968-69, and the virtual disappearance of SMON in 1970 could be explained by the time taken for food treated with with these compounds to grow, be harvested, marketed, and consumed, and for toxic levels to accumulate. It is not suggested that the specific compounds named were the cause of SMON, but they are examples of how the use and subsequent control of other environmental pollutants in Japan could fit the rise and fall of SMON incidence. One hypothesis for SMON in which CQL might have played a causal role and which would explain the apparent inconsistencies discussed is suggested by these considerations. The necessary cause of SMON might have been an environmental agent -for example, a medicine, virus (compare the pre-CQL theories about SMON), or chemicalthat was much more widely distributed in Japan, and in higher concentrations, than in other countries. This agent might have appeared in Japan in the early 1950s and disappeared in the late 1960s. The agent would have been able to cause SMON on its own, but, in combination with CQL, its potential for doing so would have been greatly enhanced; CQL on its own, however, could not have caused SMON except in very rare circumstances. People suffering from the diseases listed in Table IV Apart from the indirect evidence on levels of environmental pollutants in Japan already discussed, there is no real evidence for or against this theory. Nevertheless, interactions between two or more factors as the possible cause of some environmentally determined diseases should not be overlooked, although these interactions are obviously likely to be more difficult to investigate than instances where only one factor is involved; the epidemiological study of possible interactions is, indeed, in its infancy. Which agent is 'causative' in these circumstances, especially where both are necessary, is something of a philosophical question. In the case of a two-factor hypothesis for SMON, CQL could be an enhancer of a necessary cause but probably not the necessary cause itself.
It is theoretically possible that SMON was the result of the contamination of CQL with something else. However, SMON occurred in some patients who had taken Japanese preparations, and in some who had taken imported preparations; there is no evidence or reason for believing that the same contaminant was mixed with, and later excluded from, both Japanese and imported preparations. (The same general argument applies to CQL degradation products.) In addition, the full SMON syndrome is a specific clinical entity, which is not characteristic of known toxic substances. A contamination explanation for SMON thus seems unlikely.
CONCLUSION ON SMON
It would be unreasonable to take an absolutely rigid view about all the inconsistencies in the CQL hypothesis for SMON and to conclude that, so long as even one remained, the hypothesis could not be accepted. The thalidomide episode demonstrated that phocomelia sometimes occurred in those with no apparent history of having taken the preparation; in the case of sudden deaths in asthma, the eventual decline in mortality probably preceded any formal warnings. Reasons have, however, been given for doubting that similar inconsistencies in the case of CQL and SMON can reasonably be explained within similar margins of tolerance; in addition, the SMON controversy is characterized not simply by one or two serious inconsistencies but by a series-the apparent absence of SMON until long after the introduction of CQL, its decline before CQL sales were suspended, a large proportion of SMON patients who did not, apparently, take CQL, no dose-response relationship, and the virtual absence of SMON outside Japan. (Finally, although outside the scope of this review, there are at present no convincing data from animal experiments.)
WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE SMON CoNmovERsY
It would be easy to set SMON on one side as a strange disease, confined to one country, and caused by a 'useless' medicine the precise role of which in the SMON epidemic requires no further definition than it has already received. Yet the SMON controversy could prove something of a water-shed in the study of the adverse effects of medicines. Contemporary reactions to suggestions that a preparation may have adverse effects are partly, perhaps largely, conditioned by the fact that these claims have so far usually been substantiated-for example, chloramphenicol in aplastic anaemia, thalidomide in phocomelia, aerosols in asthma deaths, and oral contraceptives in thromboembolic disease. By contrast, several more recent episodes have been much less easy to resolve than these earlier ones. The nature of the relationship between postoperative jaundice and exposure to holothane is hotly disputed (see Inman and Mushin, 1974 and subsequent correspondence); the demonstration that halothane affects liver function, as assessed by changes in serum enzyme levels, (Wright et al., 1975; Trowell, Trowell, Peto, and Crampton Smith, 1975) strengthens, but by no means settles, the case. Whether tolbutamide causes rather than prevents arterial complications in diabetics is another controversial issue (Feinstein, 1971) . Data on the relationship between reserpine and breast cancer (Armstrong, Stevens, and Doll, 1974; Heinonen et al., 1974; Boston Collaborative Drug Surveillance Program, 1974) have stimulated much critical discussion about appropriate study methods and a growing realization of difficulties of interpretation that may arise in this and similar cases. The prima .facie case that reserpine is involved in the aetiology of breast cancer remains strong, although in an inquiry in which both the breast cancer patients and the subjects with whom they were compared came from the same defined population, Mack et al. (1975) found no association, and have thus introduced a substantial element of doubt. The SMON epidemic shows signs of being assimilated into the case-law of undisputed cause and effect associations (Lawson and Wilson, 1974) although it is perhaps the best available example of these much more open and unresolved episodes.
The continuing production of powerful therapeutic agents carries with it the virtual certainty of further unwanted reactions, while inquiries such as the Boston Collaborative Drug Surveillance Program (1974) will ensure that many of these reactions are detected, as indeed they should be. Associations that may at first sight seem to be of a causal nature, but eventually prove not to be, will almost certainly also come to light under modern conditions of surveillance. There is a great deal to be lost by failing to distinguish true from spurious adverse effects. A central concern in the halothane debate, for example, has rightly been that the value of this generally accepted and widely used anaesthetic should not be compromised by allegations of toxicity that may be unfounded. Many fear that the use of other anaesthetics, consequent on anxieties of possible litigation in the event of jaundice after halothane, could be against the best interests of thousands of patients undergoing surgery.
Over-ready acceptance of the possible adverse effects of medicines is only one aspect of a wider debate about the costs and benefits not only of medicines but of other substances. There are signs that the outcome of this debate could be to the detriment of useful advances in the fields of community health and clinical medicine. Environmental hysteria, rather than objective appraisal, characterized much of a recent campaign against DDT which, had it been successful, would almost certainly have cost many lives. The 1958 Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in the United States (reviewed in Preventive Medicine, 1973) and insistence on inappropriate and uniformative toxicological testing in animals (Lancet, 1973) are other examples of measures that are probably more likely to delay progress than prevent harm. Over-caution in prescribing may sometimes have disastrous consequences; in amphotericin pharmacophobia, Symmers (1973) reported on five patients who died because amphotericin was withheld, although it was obviously indicated. Wade (1974) used the examples of chloroform, cyclamates, oral hypoglycaemic agents, and oral contraceptives to show how either the nature or manner of a decision about possible adverse effects may have undesirable consequences.
It is only necessary to compare modem with earlier methods of treatment in diseases as different as leprosy and hypertension to appreciate the advances that pharmaceutical research and development have brought about. The conquest of many other diseases, including under-nutrition, depends inter alia on further advances of a similar kind. There is, however, an increasing number of obstacles to further progress (Spinks, 1974; Weatherall, 1974) ; one of these could easily turn out to be over-eagerness to accept scientifically unsubstantiated allegations of adverse effects, especially if 'guilty until proved innocent' is the starting-point. This view is not by any means to argue for the unmonitored use of new compounds but it does argue, among other things, for very searching investigations in the study of alleged side-effects. It is possible to define at least four purposes to which the results of such studies may be put. The first is the decision whether or not to restrict the use of a medicine, and considerations of its clinical value are clearly relevant here. The second is to make a scientific evaluation of the probability that the agent is the cause of the unwanted effect, and here neither its clinical value nor decisions about its continued use are to the point; this evaulation may provide valuable information on the aetiology and prevention of other diseases, which makes it especially important that it should be entirely objective. Doll (1971) has rightly pointed out that different study techniques are necessary in different circumstances; it may therefore not be useful to try to draw up routine methods or criteria by which to judge the likelihood of a cause and effect relationship. However, the case against a medicine should be able to command fairly general agreement before it is finally accepted as such. The third use depends very much on the second and is the fair and swift compensation of those affected, where cause and effect have been shown to be reasonably likely. Fourthly, the pharmaceutical industry will have to decide what further research and development it will or will not pursue.-These are fairly distinct issues, and the balance of evidence could be used to make different decisions under different headings-for example, a medicine could be withdrawn from use under the first, while the scientific and legal questions remained unresolved. However, therapeutic progress in the future stands to suffer if decisions against the further use of medicines under the first heading become, or are made to become, the basis for decisions under the other three. SMON has provided an excellent opportunity to review and re-assess all the scientific and social implications of the whole field.
